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FOREWORD
JOHN PAUL STEVENS*

Over the course of my legal career, my assessment of at least one
stage of the jury process has changed as I have participated in the
justice system from both sides of the bench. During my years as a
practicing lawyer, I viewed the arbitrary right to exclude individual
members of the venire from acting as jurors in particular trials as one
of the litigant's fundamental procedural protections. History, tradition, and the adversary character of the trial process supported my
view that the peremptory challenge had the status of an inalienable
right.
During my years as a judge, I have increasingly viewed the peremptory challenge as an aspect of what Roscoe Pound described as
the "sporting theory" of justice.' Shrewd decisions about peremptory
challenges may give one adversary a tactical advantage that has
nothing to do with the fair administration of justice. Over the years,
my examination of a host of voir dire transcripts has persuaded me
that the vast amounts of valuable court time routinely expended in
questioning prospective jurors in order to decide whether or not to
exercise a peremptory challenge produce minimal benefits at best.
Moreover, there is a significant cost associated with peremptory
challenges that is generally ignored.
When Abraham Lincoln referred to government "by the people"
as a hallmark of democracy, we usually assume that he was referring
to the people's exercise of governmental power in the polling booth.
But Lincoln was both a great President and a great trial lawyer. He
also might have been referring to the people's exercise of governmental power in the courthouse. For service on a jury is not merely a
duty; it is also a privilege to play an official role in discharging the
sovereign's responsibility for the administration of justice. A citizen
should not be denied the opportunity to serve as a juror unless an
impartial judge can state an acceptable reason for the denial. A
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challenge for cause provides such a reason; a peremptory challenge
does not.
Jury service is an enriching and rewarding experience that leaves
a lasting impression on those who are privileged to serve. Unnecessary inconveniences, delays, and costs associated with jury duty make
it a burden in many cases. It is crucial, not only to minimize those
burdens, but also to make every effort to understand and improve the
entire jury system from voir dire through to the deliberative process
that takes place after the jury has retired. Scholarship devoted to that
end has surpassing importance. Nancy Marder has already made
significant contributions to that body of work, and this symposium
promises important additional insights. I therefore urge the reader to
peruse the commentary that follows with great care.

